June 8, 2016

1968. The Perils of the New Isolationism

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's Farewell Warning
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (center) sitting with President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Johnson at the White House on March 16, 1961 (AP Photo/Henry Burroughs; source)
Bill Downs Perspective

ABC Washington

February 4, 1968

It's ironic at this time of confusion and flap here in Washington—flapping over the devaluation of the British pound; over economic, sociological, and political campaign issues; flapping over the capture of the USS Pueblo and the surprising guerilla offensive in South Vietnam—it's both ironic and somewhat sad that the Johnson administration is losing its most unflappable cabinet official.

As you know, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara is winding up an unprecedented seven years of duty in the Pentagon. The Senate this week approved President Johnson's nomination of Washington lawyer Clark Clifford to take over the Defense Department on March 1. So between now and that date, Mr. McNamara will, in a sense, be cleaning out his desk at the Pentagon; tidying up things before he moves across the Potomac to take up his new job as President of the World Bank.

A most remarkable man, McNamara was the first of the new breed of professional administrators really to take over and reorganize a major federal executive department—and the most monstrous one at that. As the advertising slogan goes: "They said it couldn't be done," but McNamara did it. He introduced rational planning and cost effectiveness and computerized management practices into the Pentagon. He unified and collated the military services and their missions, and most of all, he established once and for all the Constitutional fiat—the civilian control of the nation's armed services.

The former "boy-President" of Ford Motor Company before President Kennedy drew him into government, McNamara made more enemies than any of his predecessors in Defense. But on his leave-taking seven years later, even his most caustic critics are bidding him farewell with praise for his energy and achievements in a most impossible job. As a kind of super-bureaucrat in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, he was a most worthy opponent to the wiliest of the politicians on Capitol Hill.

One of the innovations which McNamara introduced to government was the document which, every year, manages to make headlines no matter what else is happening in the world. It's called the "Military Posture Report." And this year the "sanitized," or public version, is more than two hundred pages long. The Secretary presents the "un-sanitized," or secret version of the report, to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees—a document which runs about 250 pages long because it contains all the secret and classified data. The purpose of the Posture Report is to explain in detail why the Defense Department is asking for $79.6 billion of the taxpayers' money to assure the military security of the United States.

As we pointed out, McNamara invented this document, and this was the seventh and final such report he has made to Congress. So, in a sense, it was a kind of hail and farewell when he presented it to the Senate Armed Services Committee last Thursday.

It would appear that that the job of the Secretary of Defense, like the presidency, tends to make a philosopher out of the man to take on the office. The responsibilities of national security in the nuclear and space age test a man's sanity and moral fiber—for, in a single day, he may be asked to consider weapons capable of reducing Russia to a cinder, and an hour later be confronted with an unprincipled military supplier profiteering on a twenty-dollar bracket for a nuclear bomber.

At one point in his government career, McNamara told a Congressional committee that it was impossible for any one man to run the Defense Department—the biggest business in the world—because no one could possibly keep track of the four million items—from buttons to hydrogen bombs—which make up the Pentagon's inventory. And one Defense official pointed out that if the department operated with 99 percent efficiency (which is impossible), that the Pentagon would still make some 150,000 errors a year.

And if that wouldn't make a philosopher out of any federal cabinet officer, nothing will.

For those reasons, I'd like to quote to you from the new Posture Report presented behind closed doors to the Senate committee last week. It might be called "McNamara's Farewell Address," and his words are both eloquent and important because they deal with the future security of us all.

In his "assessment of the international situation as it bears on military policies and programs," the Secretary had this summation:

"Fundamentally, what is at issue today—as it was a decade ago and as it will be a decade from now—is the kind of world in which we and others wish to live. When this nation made the decision at the end of World War II to base its own security on the principle of collective defense, it was the hope that there could be created, under the UN charter, a world in which even the smallest state could look forward to an independent existence; free to develop in its own way, unmolested by its neighbors, and free of fear of armed attack or political domination by the more powerful nations..."

McNamara goes on to point out that to achieve this goal, the United States aligned herself with other like-minded nations in a series of mutual defense treaties to defend her collective freedom and prevent the further extension of communism. Looking back over the past twenty years, he added: "Although the record is less than perfect, the outward thrust of Soviet and Red Chinese aggression has been generally contained."

But as the outgoing Defense Secretary proceeds with his arguments in support of collective security for the free world, it becomes clear that McNamara has become concerned that the United States might be reverting to a new kind of Space Age isolationism. As he pointed out: "Collective security has paid its price...military alliances are costly to maintain. There also was the cost in blood and lives in the Korean War...and now, additional levies and casualties being paid in the defense of freedom for South Vietnam.

"But," says McNamara, "the American people have a right to ask: were these achievements worth their cost?"

And he answers: "I believe they were. We do know that the policies of unarmed isolationism and attempted neutrality which we followed before World War II, were in the end far more costly in lives and property.

"However, it must be clearly recognized that, while it is conceivable that we could return to a policy of isolationism...today this could no longer be the unarmed isolationism of the 1930s. In an age of nuclear weapons...such an option is denied us...

"Nevertheless, one could argue that we could still renounce all our mutual defense treaties, pull back our military forces to our own soil...and build a 'Fortress America' so powerful as to deter virtually any enemy or combination of enemies from deliberately attacking our territory..."

But there would be a dreadful cost for such a Fortress, says the Secretary. "We could deal with the rest of the world on a strictly arms-length basis. But that would be an entirely different world than the one we now live in...and an entirely different United States as well.

"Without dependable friends or allies, we would surely have to maintain a larger military establishment than at present. We would also have to reorient our industry and commerce to achieve a maximum degree of economic self-sufficiency with a lower standard of living for our people...and considerably less economic freedom for all...a far more uncertain and dangerous world, and one in which our influence over the course of events would be greatly diminished..."

In other words, says McNamara, "Isolationism is clearly an undesirable alternative to our continued involvement in the responsibilities of world affairs and collective defense..."

It may seem strange to find a responsible government official in 1968 arguing for the national imperatives debated by President Woodrow Wilson some fifty years ago.

But Secretary McNamara is concerned about the so-called "liberal isolationists" who have joined the conservatives in slashing attacks on the administration's military and economic aid programs. And he recognizes that the American people have become somewhat disillusioned and weary with the problems of the rest of the world.

But McNamara argues: "We must never forget that, of all nations, we have the most at stake. And the existence of an open, outward-looking, humane society in the United States depends upon the vitality of similar societies elsewhere..."

As the poet John Donne said, "No man is an island." In his farewell report to the Congress, Robert McNamara said that this same principle also applies to nations—those nations who would enjoy freedom with other peoples of the world.

This is Bill Downs in Washington.

June 1, 2016

1963. Edward R. Murrow: The Voice of Uncle Sam

The Voice of Uncle Sam
Edward R. Murrow in 1957 (source)
Article by Arthur Herzog published in True magazine, June 1963, p. 14:

Edward R. Murrow: The Voice of Uncle Sam

by Arthur Herzog
Idleness is a sin and ignorance the great bogeyman to Ed Murrow. As chief propagandist for the U.S., he heads the biggest hoopla machine ever assembled.
Washington, D.C.

To top officials of the United States Information Agency, two delicate problems must be faced continually. First, whether the USIA is communicating to the world an image of the U.S. that is both accurate and appealing; and second, whether its director, Edward R. Murrow, can be compelled to wear an overcoat in freezing weather when he dashes off on foot to the White House, 500 yards distant.

Not long ago, I visited Murrow and the USIA in Washington. Shortly before, Murrow had come down with pneumonia during a trip to the Middle East, and returned to the United States for hospitalization. "Ed was a model patient," a colleague said, "but only because the doctor was wise enough not to ask him to stay off the phone or give up smoking." For a time, Murrow's slow recovery gave rise to suspicions of cancer of the lung, a worry which proved unfounded ("Hell, if Ed had had cancer he would have been indignant," said Bill Downs, a former CBS telecaster recently turned novelist. "He always felt that by the time he got it there would be a cure."), and Murrow was released from the hospital, under strict medical orders to take it easy.

Neither the doctor nor his own obvious physical weakness stopped Murrow from working a 12-to-14 hour day, smoking his normal ration of 60-to-80 cigarettes, or going out without his overcoat. Murrow's co-workers have a way of knowing when the director is trembling on the brink of exhaustion. His cigarette droops.

Just why Ed Murrow drives himself until he literally sweats with fatigue is a question that nobody close to him can answer with confidence. "About his health Ed has absolutely no brains," his attractive wife Janet told me, "and I hope he sees that in print." William S. Paley, of CBS, once said of Murrow, "I don't see why he runs himself so ragged. Unless it's that he thinks he thinks better when he's got sweat pouring from his forehead." Larry LeSueur, a telecaster and former member of what was called "the Murrow club" at CBS, accounts for it by saying, "It's his Puritan side. Murrow believes that idleness is a sin."

To LeSueur, Murrow-the-Puritan is just one of many Murrows making up what could be called the Murrow image. "There's Murrow-the-Southern-gentleman—he was born down South, you know—with his code. He almost never gossips, and shrinks from real crudity. He's got an intense sense of honor and integrity. There's Murrow-the-Westerner, breezy, open, confident, fiercely loyal to his friends, the man of action. Why do you suppose he smokes so much? Some sort of masculine symbol to him, I bet. There's Murrow-the-Brooding-Pessimist—I'm not sure I believe he's as pessimistic as he makes out. There's a little of the ham in Murrow. There's Murrow-the-Patriot with his love of country and feeling of responsibility for it. In his own way he's almost as complicated as the American image is, and made up of the same stuff."

At 54, Ed Murrow is, as he calls himself sometimes with a small smile, the chief propagandist of the U.S. Arrayed under Murrow is the most far-reaching and massive propaganda machinery the U.S. has ever assembled, in war or peace. The USIA, or the United States Information Service, as it is called overseas—"I haven't been able to find out why," Murrow says—operates in all sorts of ways and all sorts of places. Its radio, the Voice of America, has more volume than ABC, CBS and NBC together. It publishes over 70 magazines, prints comic books (political satires) and textbooks for the study of English, produces records and dispatches cultural exhibitions. Though local people may not be aware of it, in some places the USIA's wire service provides half the news for their papers and the USIA's canned radio shows fill the air.

During the Cuban crisis the USIA distributed 50,000 photographs of Soviet missile sites. These, published in foreign newspapers, were instrumental in convincing the world of the truth of U.S. claims. When the USIA is fully cranked up for an emergency, as in the Cuban crisis, it can reach a half-billion people, which is about one out of four, outside the U.S., in the whole world. And it does all this, as Murrow never tires of telling the congressmen who appropriate the funds, on a budget of $119 million, which is less than the cost of a combat-ready Polaris submarine.

Murrow begins his day at 6:30 a.m. (Saturdays included), and by the time his government Lincoln arrives for him at 8:30, he has read six newspapers. ("Murrow gets a kick out of the chauffeured limousine," a friend said.) From then on, until the cigarette droops, he is wrapped up in the problems of making American life and policy "intelligible and, if possible, palatable" to the collective farmer in Siberia and the African with his transistor radio. He also tried to make the USIA intelligible and palatable to the dubious congressmen who sometimes think that selling America should be like "selling a Cadillac," in the words of one senator. "The Congress of the United States," Murrow has said sternly, "has no faith in the potency of ideas."

Murrow's day may be interrupted by a meeting of the National Security Council, or its even more select Executive Committee, at whose hush-hush and august deliberations basic U.S. Cold War strategy is planned. Murrow is the first USIA director to sit on the NSC, which indicates something of how importantly the Administration regards propaganda. When a policy is made, Murrow goes back to 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, a number the Agency has cunningly contrived to have its address, and the USIA begins beaming it to the world.

Despite the pressures on Murrow—from within, one senses, as well as without—he is a casual man who, whenever he gets the chance, refers to himself as a reporter. "He still can't finish his appointments on time," his secretary told me, "but he's a lot better than he used to be." Murrow eats lunch in public restaurants like a plain civil servant, despite the fact that strangers are always wandering over from the bar to chat. He has an aversion to paper work and carries a briefcase gingerly, as though it contained a Russian head. Murrow, an easy-talking man whose conversation is salted with "hell's" and "ain't's," likes to end the day as a newscaster does a program, with a joke, and goes home satisfied when he leaves his two secretaries laughing. It is impossible to think of a Washington official of similar rank who receives a foreign ambassador in his shirt sleeves, collar open, and tie at half-mast, snapping his red suspenders, as Murrow does.

Murrow likes a good time and is probably among the best raconteurs in Washington on the rare occasion when he unfolds his talent. "He can imitate Churchill and make you feel like he's in the room," a friend said. "I've never seen Murrow turn down a drink," LeSueur says, "but he prefers such oddities as Scotch and water without ice—he picked that up during the war—and a whisky sour without fruit." Murrow is a snappy dresser who has his clothes tailor-made in London, but he hasn't gotten round to buying a new suit in three years, and even when he buys one he wears it with a soiled trenchcoat or an old hat. Murrow likes to say he is fond of fine food, fine wine and fine restaurants, but those who know him well declare that Murrow wouldn't know a good wine from a bad one, and almost never eats. He likes fast cars and owns a Thunderbird. He drives it so infrequently, however, that he sometimes can't find his own house.

What does preoccupy Ed Murrow are his responsibilities at the USIA, which he takes in dead earnest. "Ed wants to play every part of the Washington game," said Stanley Plesent, the USIA's legal counsel. "I can't recall a similarly ranked official who sat through every minute of the Congressional budget hearings for his department, as Murrow did. Congress gave us most, but not all, of what we asked for 1963. That was a real tribute to Ed, especially since he refused to pad our budget, as some agencies and departments do. What cutting there was had nothing to do with him. I told him that, but he wouldn't listen. He takes every defeat personally."

One of Murrow's first actions after being appointed USIA director was to ask, "What's happened to Reed Harris?" In 1953, Harris was acting director of the USIA, then under the Department of State and known as the United States International Information Administration. Harris was attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy for a few lines from a book he had written about college football, and resigned because he got no support from his superiors. It was Harris' testimony before McCarthy that Murrow featured in one of his two anti-McCarthy shows. Murrow learned that Harris was now running a public relations agency in Washington, and rehired him in a high executive post at the USIA. "I'd become a kind of symbol of the resistance to McCarthy," Harris, who took a salary cut to come back to the government, told me, "and there was a kind of symbolism in my returning."

It seems strange, considering Murrow's record for outspokenness, but one criticism leveled against him in Washington is that he has been too quiet. "He's too cautious. Murrow has the highest reputation," a member of the White House inner sanctum said. "He can get through to the President any time he wants. The President is always concerned with what his reactions will be. Murrow would be listened to no matter what he said, especially since he's been silent so much."

Liberals have missed Murrow's independent voice on TV. "But it would be a mistake," a close friend said, "to regard Murrow as a starry-eyed liberal. He's not so much an optimistic believer in progress as a moralist and a man who believes in the due process of law." Murrow's wife Janet says, "Ed is modest in areas where he doesn't feel qualified. He will fight when he knows what he's talking about and the time seems right."

Averell Harriman, former Governor of New York and now the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs said, "Ed has matured. He was a crusader for causes but he now feels one needs more information to be sure of his opinions. He has a great sense of wanting to be sure he's right. The USIA needed character, and Murrow has given it that—it was impersonal before. He's given it purpose and direction. He understands what the United States is all about—he's one of the few who understand it well."

Murrow has, in fact, spoken out on various issues since coming to Washington. He has hit at one-newspaper towns, the treatment of African diplomats in the capital, and "a disinclination to the service of man, a preoccupation with the gainful pursuit of money, position and status." He has lectured virtually the entire communications industry in the U.S. on its responsibilities; to Hollywood executives, he said that American films, with their accent on sex and violence, presented a false picture. "I wonder," he said, "how much truth there is if we compare the celluloid world of America with the real world of America." Murrow's speech got mixed reviews. One critic called him a "smatterer . . . who knows little about the film medium" and whose "accusations were sheer nonsense."

As Murrow sees it, the job of the USIA is "to wage a war against pestilence and poverty, suffering and suspicion, disappointment and distrust. Ours is the war not to capture the minds of men but to free them." Part of that job is to break some of the stereotypes held round the world about the United States.

"Before the Administration," presidential assistant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. told me, "our own propaganda reinforced the idea that we were conservative, dogmatic, committed to free enterprise in the sense that every country should have it. This didn't reflect the reality. The truth about us proves to be more attractive to the world. Under Murrow, we have told the truth."

As it happens, I had several long conversations with Murrow while he was at CBS, and during one of them he defined for me his goal in making documentaries. "The real objective," he said, "is not to look for the sensational or the unusual, but not to flinch when the picture shows ignorance, bigotry and intolerance. My idea is to show 'what is'—to hold up the mirror and try to keep it steady."

He has followed the same policy at the USIA. The Agency has faithfully reported bus burnings in Alabama and student riots in Mississippi. Recently, Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, during a tour of Africa, was reported to have said that Africans weren't ready for self-government. It so outraged several African countries that they refused to let Ellender in. The USIA reported the story as it happened.

For this article, I interviewed Murrow several times in his comfortable corner office at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. The office has a long, curved desk; a color photograph of John F. Kennedy peers down from the wall, as it does in all government offices. Murrow is not especially a collector of trophies, but he brought two of them from CBS—the microphone on which he broadcast from London during the war, and a bust of Franklin D. Roosevelt by Jo Davidson, which reporter colleagues gave him. As in his CBS office, Murrow has a reading stand at which, standing up, he skims through magazines between appointments. He receives visitors at a small circular table flanked by chairs and a couch. One senses that he is not at his desk very often. The top is bleak and the desk stands like an alien presence.

Despite his recent illness, Murrow seemed little changed from his days as a broadcaster. Gray has stolen into his hair and the lines on his face are a little more stark. The bushy eyebrows give him a vague resemblance to Roosevelt but, as I determined with a quick glance at the bust, his nose hasn't quite the stature of Roosevelt's powerful beak. "Murrow," I'd hear again and again, "is really very shy. And he hates interviews." He is, in fact, open and extremely friendly until the questions start. At this point he falls into what might be called the classic Murrow stance—knees apart, elbows on knees, one hand supporting a bent hand, the other nervously stroking his hair or his tie. Every answer is considered, pondered, agonized.

I knew of Murrow's habit of mulling over questions as though he were in a trance. Murrow's associates, in fact, sometimes don't know when the boss has finished talking and, after waiting an appropriate time, they start again, to find that Murrow has started, too. During my interviews with him at CBS Murrow had explained his own technique of interviewing. "The key to TV interviewing," he said, "is to ask a question and after the person answers you, wait. The man says to himself that this fool must have misunderstood me. So he repeats himself. It's the second part of the answer that's valuable." On Murrow I tried the same trick, but there is no outwitting him. The silences between us sometimes lasted a full two minutes.

I began by asking Murrow a personal question. Did his $21,000 a year government salary represent a financial sacrifice, or had he, over the years in which he had earned well in excess of $200,000 a year, saved enough to become independently fixed?

Murrow mulled. "I'm not a rich man," he said finally. "I couldn't live for the rest of my life without working, at least, not without considerable belt-tightening. It's hard to get rich in what my tax bracket was. I can't live on my government salary and I will say that I am divesting myself of my basic holdings. My one extravagance is the farm. But I'd rather not talk about it. I'm wary of people who put the emphasis on their personal sacrifice rather than on the help they give to their country."

I waited, and Murrow did add, "When I came down here I intended to do some official entertaining. Somebody said, 'Do you know what the entertainment allowance is here? Five hundred dollars.' 'A week?' I said. 'No,' he said, 'a year.' So much for entertaining," Murrow laughed.

I then asked Murrow how it felt to be on the inside of things as a government official rather than the outside, as a reporter. "I still have to force myself to remember I'm not a reporter. I'm fascinated to see how things really work. There is a sense of history. I'm extremely interested to read what my former colleagues say and compare it with the fact. You'd be surprised how often you read the inside story in the next day's paper, but sometimes the news seems like it was written off the wall. One bad thing is that I've become cautious about talking with old colleagues. I can never be sure if I've read something in a top-secret file or not."

I waited, and nothing happened. McCarthy, I said, had attacked the USIA hard. Were the effects still there? "The McCarthy scars are still there, though receding," Murrow said, after the customary silence. "It takes a long while to re-establish confidence, to have candid reporting without fear that someday you won't be victimized for it. Once you create a confusion between dissent and disloyalty it takes a long time to get the difference straight again."

Murrow refused to say if, or on what issues, he had dissented since coming to Washington. "The difference between now and the old days is that when I dissent I do it in private." We turned to a discussion of the American image. I asked if it was difficult conveying that image abroad and Murrow said it was. "We're handicapped in being a very complex society that takes a high degree of literacy to understand. The system is tough to explain, a fact we must accept."

I remembered a line from a book, Image of America, by a French Dominican priest and an authority on international affairs, Father R. L. Bruckberger, who said, ". . . the greatest fault you have . . . is the inability to make yourselves known for what you are. Americans, you are not easy to understand, and perhaps for that very reason you are hard to love." I asked Murrow if it was true that Americans are not very well loved in many places.

"Yes, in some places we do have an unfavorable image. It's partly, as I said, that the system is hard to explain. Part of it is the price a country pays for having great power. Part of it is because of a certain image of ourselves that comes from movies, TV, and printed money which gives a distorted picture of crime, violence and sex, as though those are really all we have. And part of it is due to the picture which some people have of this being a 19th century capitalist operation, which, of course, it isn't."

Did he think, as some have said, that the country lacked dynamic ideas? "No," Murrow said. "We have our basic and revolutionary goals in our documents, such as the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. This nation has never been allergic to change. Ours was the first of the great modern revolutions and it's a birthright we can't let go by default. The United States should offer its experience and energies to the world."

Was the USIA strictly a tool of the Cold War? "This Agency was never designed as a provocation to anyone. We are fighting against poverty, disease and ignorance. We are fighting for enlightenment—not to capture the minds of men but to free them. I can't imagine the circumstances—including the absence of a Cold War—in which the USIA would be unnecessary."

And you try to tell the truth? "Yes. We also attempt to reflect meaningful dissent. We work on the assumption that everything we do is subject to comparison, though this isn't always the case, strictly speaking. But our idea is that if we don't tell the bad things somebody else will. It's better that it should come from us. This establishes credibility. In the fiasco of the Cuban invasion, for instance, we didn't try to temper the wind. We deliberately reflect significant controversy, partly because there is so little of it in many places. It arouses curiosity. Of course, when something is contrary to official policy—like the bus burning in Alabama—we point that out."

Out of what controversy have you gotten significant mileage? "The President's handling of the steel issue was a big plus for us. The Russians say the country has one law for the rich and another for the poor. The steel issue showed that there wasn't."

Do you spend most of your energies attacking the Soviets? "We're probably less heavy on the anti-communist stuff than formerly. We've found that it's more important to show our side—to be positive rather than negative."

What, on a policy level, would you regard as the USIA's greatest accomplishment since you've been in Washington, I asked. Murrow pondered, his hand stroking his tie. When he inhales, he makes a sucking noise, I noticed. He said finally, "The eight-month delay, in 1961, of U.S. resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, after the Soviets had resumed their tests. I wanted the delay, to let the Russian breaking of the test moratorium to sink in. It gave us a chance to explain thoroughly to the world why we did have to resume. When we did, there was remarkably little criticism."

Where did the USIA stand in the deliberations about what to do in the Cuban crisis? "I'm afraid I can't say," Murrow said. "I was flat on my back. Being out of action then was the most frustrating experience of my life."

You once said that you were a poor administrator. Would you still say that's true? "I'm not sure I'm so good at administration but I'm sure I can do it, though I don't particularly like it."

Why do you think you work so hard? "Because of early indoctrination. If I weren't doing something I'd feel guilty. That's why I can't take a vacation. It's an irrational, contemptible attitude, I know."

Are you happy at the USIA? Will you stay on here? Murrow sucked and pondered deeply. "I've never worked harder and never been happier. I don't miss broadcasting a bit. It would be fun to give a few seminars a week on government and read the books I've never had time to. But as to the future, I've never had a horizon of more than 90 days."

Leaving Murrow, I checked with other USIA officials on what Murrow had accomplished in Washington. "Of course he was involved in the Cuban crisis," one high USIA administrator said. "He made key calls during the decisive week from his sick bed. It's a reasonable surmise that the Agency advised strongly that the use of an invasion or air strike in Cuba would have unfavorable reactions abroad, especially Latin America. He has had a strong effect on our policy in West Berlin, and he was instrumental in bringing Vice-President Johnson over when the wall was built. He's brought a quality of imagination and high purpose and he's lifted morale: when Murrow says he could compete with any commercial media outfit with the staff he has it's for internal consumption. Murrow has his faults—maybe, as an administrator, he doesn't dig deep enough and he hasn't shaken things up here as much as some would have liked—but he's worked like hell. He's the best director we've had."

If part of the American image is the old, improbable, rags-to-riches story, Murrow fits that, too. "He's very proud of his poor background," Downs said. "I think he regards his wealth and fame as a big joke." Murrow himself says, "I can't remember a time when I didn't have to work."

Christened Egbert Roscoe, Murrow was born on April 25, 1908, on a small farm at Pole Cat Creek, North Carolina. When Murrow was 4, his father moved to the state of Washington, where prospects looked better, taking a job as a farmhand near Blanchard, north of Seattle. For a time, the Murrow family lived in a tent. Murrow's father eventually went to work on a logging railroad, as a locomotive engineer, and Murrow did odd jobs there too. During high school, he drove the school bus.

Murrow wanted to attend an Eastern university; he worked for two years with a timber gang to save the money before deciding he couldn't save enough. He attended several Western colleges, majoring in speech and acting, and graduated with good marks. One man who went to college with Murrow claims that he could sit through classes without taking a note and later rattle off the lectures almost verbatim. Murrow's original choice of a career doesn't reveal any burning ambition for money and fame. He worked for a student organization arranging student tours to Europe, at a salary of $25 a week. He then became vice-president of the Institute of International Education, also at low pay. Attracted by his title, a small women's college offered Murrow the job of president, an offer that was immediately withdrawn when the college learned that he was only 26.

In 1935, Murrow went to work for CBS as director of talks and special events. I was curious to know what his early associates in broadcasting thought of him and checked with John Gude, now a performers' agent, who knew Murrow then. "Well, he was the smokingest man I'd ever met," Gude said. "No notice was taken at the time of Murrow's sonorous voice. He was discreet, quiet, pleasant, a hell of a nice guy to drink or play poker with. If anybody had asked me whether he would go places I would have said I never thought of it but maybe he will."

Murrow started going places, at least geographically, in 1937, when he was offered a job as head of CBS European radio, the network's former top correspondent having quit because he saw no future in overseas news. CBS itself considered the assignment routine. Murrow's job was to arrange cultural shows, concerts and the like, but he had ambitious ideas about putting on programs like Saturday Night in the Spread Eagle Pub at Little Barfield, Sussex, which he later did. He still wasn't a broadcaster—"Why would I have become one, with a job like that?" he once said—and was made one by the march of events. When Hitler took over Austria, Murrow decided to cover it, chartering a 27-passenger plane, the only one available, and flying to Vienna where he broadcast for 10 days, establishing not only himself but the concept of the foreign radio correspondent.

Murrow had been deeply concerned with the rise of Hitler almost since its beginning—he participated in an early project to bring German scholars out of the country—and Kenneth Holland, president of the Institute of International Education and an old Murrow friend, believes that "Murrow made the greatest contribution of any American toward the understanding, before the war, of what Nazism meant."

Among correspondents he was known as a daredevil who took terrible chances despite strenuous efforts of CBS to stop him. Murrow, for example, drove around during the bombings in an open car and went out on at least 25 bombing missions. On one of them, five planes carried correspondents but only one, Murrow's, got back. As to why Murrow felt compelled to risk his neck, Raymond Swing, a correspondent now with the USIA, said to me, "Murrow felt that a correspondent shouldn't be making a living off the war with no danger. It isn't that he's a daredevil. It's just that he felt guilty."

After the war, it was commonly felt that radio news had no future. Murrow felt differently, which was one reason he accepted a job as CBS vice-president. As such, Murrow felt he could hold together his staff—such newsmen as William L. Shirer, Eric Sevareid, Howard K. Smith, LeSueur and Downs—until the tide turned. Murrow also had ambitions about making radio, and later television, "adult and intelligent," as he said. "Murrow's second big contribution," Holland said, "was to show the potentials of television documentaries, which he did with 'Person to Person' and 'See It Now.'"

Murrow's conscience led him to take on the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his surgical exposé of McCarthy's methods and personality is believed to have been the turning point in the senator's career. "It was very brave of Murrow," a friend said. "The night that show went on, Murrow didn't know if he'd have a job in the morning." Murrow himself was still not satisfied. "He worried," Downs said, "whether he'd exposed McCarthy too late."

Murrow was still feuding with broadcasting standards—he once suggested that every sponsor donate one hour out of every 52 to public affairs shows, an idea that was received in stony silence. He had the temerity to criticize the quality of television but whether, without the USIA job, he would have quit, is a matter of debate. Murrow, with his usual tact, says no, but others say yes. "He'd reached the point of no return," Gude said. "He was continually upset by the network's notion that newscasters shouldn't be interpreters." Others feel that the real source of friction between Murrow and the network brass was that Murrow had gotten too big for corporate vanity to tolerate. "Anyway," says Swing, "Murrow had reached his point of greatest expansion in television. There wasn't enough left for him to do that he hadn't done. If he had stayed where he was he couldn't have kept growing."

Actually, Murrow had a chance to get into politics in 1958 when he was offered the New York nomination to run for the Senate, with the backing of all factions of the Democratic Party. "I think he could have won," said Governor Harriman, who lost to Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the same year. Murrow decided, he says, "that politics wasn't for me. Politics requires a special appetite for public office, a desire for unlimited exposure and an undiscriminating liking for people. I don't have any of these qualifications. It's a fair assumption that I won't run for office in 1964, either."

Those close to Murrow were somewhat surprised when he got the USIA bid, considering that Murrow, during the 1960 Democratic convention, said on air that Senator Kennedy had not shown the amount of humility that Murrow felt was needed for the office. Kennedy's offering his critic the job evidently satisfied Murrow, and he went to Washington, on the condition that he would have a voice in making policies that the USIA would support before the world.

Murrow's relations with the President are said to be friendly though not intimate, and marked by mutual respect. "The President," a man who knows both of them said, "likes a person like Murrow who can come in, speak his piece candidly and get out, which Murrow, with his gift for the right words, can do. The President doesn't like long-winded people, which Murrow isn't."

When Murrow arrived in Washington he deliberately set out to "acquire anonymity," as he put it. "He'd walk down the street with well-known politicians, and people would say 'Hello, Ed,' which embarrassed him," Janet Murrow said.

Murrow does relax once in a while, as when, infrequently, he goes to his 300-acre farm at Pawling, New York, for a few days' rest. He likes machinery and drives a tractor, plowing fields. There is a small dam on his property that he built. On such vacations Murrow will wear blue jeans and not shave for days at a time. Another Murrow delight is to take off in a car with his son Casey, now 16, and drive cross-country, fishing on the way. He has tried it once since joining the USIA, and got as far as Salt Lake City before being called back.

In Washington, Murrow and his wife live simply, with one car and one servant. "I do as much of my own work as I can," Mrs. Murrow said, "because I fear there may be some kind of upheaval in the world and I want to know that I can take care of myself."

Murrow gets to Burning Tree Country Club now and then, for a fast left-handed game of golf, which he shoots in the low 80's, and he might drop in, unannounced, at his old friends, the Downses, on the way home. "Sometimes he throws a football with my kids," Downs said, "but mostly we reminisce. Murrow's got a million anecdotes. I know a man who traveled in South America with him. He says that Murrow told anecdotes for three weeks and didn't repeat himself once.

"Sometimes, too, we watch television. We did that last election night and had a good time—two warhorses criticizing the new methods. Murrow is a hell of a lot of fun. Of course, he does brood and work himself to death. He has a tremendous love for this country. That's why he gets so mad when we goof. Murrow's one of those guys like Elmer Davis was—he's never lost his ideals, as most of us old men have. Murrow's still got that fire in his belly. He's still trying to do good."

– Arthur Herzog

May 31, 2016

1959. Walt Kelly on McCarthyism

"A Pied Piper for Know-Nothingism"
Walt Kelly's character "Simple J. Malarkey," a caricature of Senator Joseph McCarthy created during the Second Red Scare, as featured in Pogo in 1953 and 1955 (source)
Cartoonist Walt Kelly, the creator of the seminal comic strip Pogo, was known for his vocal criticism of Senator Joseph McCarthy and McCarthyism in the 1950s. He satirized the era in Pogo with the wildcat "Simple J. Malarkey," a clear caricature of McCarthy. In the excerpt below, Kelly reflects on the McCarthy years.

From "Ten Ever-Lovin' Blue Eyed Years With Pogo" by Walt Kelly (1959)
There was a time in the proud days between 1948 and 1956 when a great many of us in this land of the free and home of the brave were anything but either. In these latter (1959) more or less golden days of happy preoccupation with other greeds and other envies we should remember this. We confounded our friends abroad and dumbfounded our enemies at home. None of them expected that we were so soft in the head or hard in the heart.

Those years were our own fault, not the fault of any one individual or group, and years like them will be our fault again. As I stand here on this platform I hold between thumb and forefinger a nose that remembers a list of many, many more than 205 belly-whopping heroes who sledded out of sight in the yellow gloom of that gathering wintry dark. Properly pressed, we can all remember individual contributors to the shame of the years. We blame several advertisers for withdrawing their support of TV shows that protested against our un-American activities; we blame certain dismal desert stretches of the Press. And we can forget much of our Sweet Alice Congress and Administration who were with delight when Joe gave them a smile and trembled with fear at his frown. Who can forget, Ben Bolt? Most of us, Ben.

A few of us gave out bitter cries to prove through the night that our flag was still there and that the reasons you went to jail did not include deriding a demagogue. But most took tongue in teeth and ran.*

"You were skating on thin ice when you had that guilt-by-assumption trial of Albert for eating the Pup-dog. But now, with this Malarkey stuff, you've broken through."

It didn't seem to me then, nor does it now, that a comic version of Senatorial low-jinks was dangerous. Of my then three hundred and fifty editors, not one objected. They'd be the last to think they'd been courageous in running the material. In short, the whole situation might be termed "over-evaluated."

At about this time a student in an audience at the department of journalism at the University of Michigan leaped to his feet with a question which implied that the Senator from Wisconsin was doing great good for his country and Kelly was not aware of it. I rallied a counterthrust in which I agreed with the young man inasmuch as the Senator was making the country newly aware of its rights; rights are for everybody, including privileged Senators, but liberty was not to be construed as license; and one of our rights still included freedom of speech, even against Senators. It was a surprise to learn later from members of the faculty that this mild piece of horse sense was a bold statement.

Returning to New York, somewhat saddened by this, I was immensely cheered when I visited Mr. Tim Costello's establishment for the Arts on Third Avenue. As I came to the door, he spied me and hurried forward.

"You'll have to speak to the little woman," he said. "She's remembered some damn thing thing that plagues her and she's breaking glasses. Our glasses."

I asked if this meant that she had had a drink. "Devil a drink she's had," he said. "She orders a Manhattan and waves it a bit. Then she says, 'That damn CBS loyalty oath!' Then she slams the glass down on the bar, spilling the drink, which is bad enough, mind you, but she snaps off the stem every time. She's not missed once." Tim sighed and looked admiringly at my wife. "CBS has done much for temperance tonight."

Those of us who had reason to question the loyalty oath could not help but be cheered by a reverse side of the coin. Bill Downs made a blistering radio attack over CBS on the cloak-and-dagger activities on Capitol Hill. "Things were just going too far," he said to me. "I couldn't take it anymore." Ed Murrow followed him over CBS-TV with a public dissection of the Pied Piper.

The Piper dealt himself a sort of coup de grâce when he took advantage of "equal time" on CBS-TV to put on such an incredible performance, complete with toupee, that Jo Coppola in the Long Island Newsday ran two pictures of Joe. One was before make-up, one after. The caption read: "Which Twin Has the Phony?" That CBS free time was the beginning of the end. With such a display of integrity, I wonder why private enterprise ever got into the gumshoe business.
_______________________________
* There has been a lot of talk about who compromised the fifty per cent of the people who professed themselves in favor of amateur demagoguery in the polls of the period. People want to be liked, and when they answer poll questions they tend to give answers they hope are popular. One of the noisiest and most militant groups we ever had in this country was the large bunch of us which, envious of others all the time anyway, found this in the early Fifties a Pied Piper for Know-Nothingism. These self-pitying few, when on the march, made a lot of flash, and many of the rest of us, having hit the dirt and crawled into the bushes, had difficulty counting the enemy as they went by. This last craven crowd, by adding up the bugle calls and the firecrackers, decided to join what seemed to be a majority. That's where the heavy poll count came from. And that, in my opinion, is exactly where to put the blame, Mame.

May 27, 2016

1966. Security in the Cold War World

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's Montreal Speech
S-75 Dvina missiles on parade in Moscow's Red Square, November 7th, 1957 (Sovfoto - source)

SECURITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors

Montreal, Canada, May 18th, 1966
Any American would be fortunate to visit this lovely island city, in this hospitable land. But there is a special satisfaction for a Secretary of Defense to cross the longest border in the world and realize that it is also the least armed border in the world. It prompts one to reflect how negative and narrow a notion of defense still clouds our century.

There is still among us an almost eradicable tendency to think of our security problem as being exclusively a military problem—and to think of the military problem as being exclusively a weapons-system or hardware problem.

The plain, blunt truth is that contemporary man still conceives of war and peace in much the same stereotyped terms that his ancestors did.

The fact that these ancestors, both recent and remote, were conspicuously unsuccessful at avoiding war, and enlarging peace, doesn't seem to dampen our capacity for cliches.

We still tend to conceive of national security almost solely as a state of armed readiness: a vast, awesome arsenal of weaponry.

We still tend to assume that it is primarily this purely military ingredient that creates security.

We are still haunted by this concept of military hardware. But how limited a concept this actually is becomes apparent when one ponders the kind of peace that exists between the United States and Canada.

It is a very cogent example. Here we are, two modern nations, highly developed technologically, each with immense territory, both enriched with great reserves of natural resources, each militarily sophisticated; and yet we sit across from one another, divided by an unguarded frontier of thousands of miles, and there is not a remotest set of circumstances, in any imaginable time frame of the future, in which our two nations would wage war on one another.

It is so unthinkable an idea as to be totally absurd. But why is that so?

Is it because we are both ready in an instant to hurl our military hardware at one another? Is it because we are both zeroed in on one another's vital targets? Is it because we are both armed to our technological teeth that we do not go to war? The whole notion, as applied to our two countries, is ludicrous.

Canada and the United States are at peace for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with our mutual military readiness. We are at peace—truly at peace—because of the vast fund of compatible beliefs, common principles, and shared ideals. We have our differences and our diversity and let us hope for the sake of a mutually rewarding relationship we never become sterile carbon copies of one another. But the whole point is that our basis of mutual peace has nothing whatever to do with our military hardware.

Now this is not to say, obviously enough, that the concept of military deterrence is no longer relevant in the contemporary world. Unhappily, it still is critically relevant with respect to our potential adversaries. But it has no relevance what ever between the United States and Canada.

We are not adversaries. We are not going to become adversaries. And it is not mutual military deterrence that keeps us from becoming adversaries. It is mutual respect for common principles. Now I mention this—as obvious as it all is—simply as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the concept that military hardware is the exclusive or even the primary ingredient of permanent peace in the mid 20th century.

In the United States over the past 5 years, we have achieved a considerably improved balance in our total military posture. That was the mandate I received from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and with their support, and that of the Congress, we have been able to create a strengthened force structure of land, sea, and air components with a vast increase in mobility and materiel and with a massive superiority in nuclear retaliatory power over any combination of potential adversaries.

Our capabilities for nuclear, conventional, and countersubversive war have all been broadened and improved; and we have accomplished this through military budgets that were in fact lesser percentages of our gross national product than in the past.

From the point of view of combat readiness, the United States has never been militarily stronger. We intend to maintain that readiness. But if we think profoundly about the matter, it is clear that this purely military posture is not the central element in our security. A nation can reach the point at which it does not buy more security for itself simply by buying more military hardware. We are at that point. The decisive factor for a powerful nation already adequately armed is the character of its relationships with the world.

In this respect, there are three broad groups of nations: first, those that are struggling to develop; secondly, those free nations that have reached a level of strength and prosperity that enables them to contribute to the peace of the world; and finally, those nations who might tempted to make themselves our adversaries. For each of these groups, the United States, to preserve its intrinsic security, has to have distinctive sets of relationships. First, we have to help protect those developing countries which genuinely need and request our help and which, as an essential precondition, are willing and able to help themselves.

Second, we have to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with those nations who can and should share international peacekeeping responsibilities.

Third, we must do all we realistically can to reduce the risk of conflict with those who might be tempted to take up arms against us.

Let us examine these three sets of relationships in detail.

The Developing Nations

First, the developing nations. Roughly 100 countries today are caught up in the difficult transition from traditional to modern societies. There is no uniform rate of progress among them, and they range from primitive mosaic societies fractured by tribalism and held feebly together by the slenderest of political sinews to relatively sophisticated countries well on the road to agricultural sufficiency and industrial competence.

This sweeping surge of development, particularly across the whole southern half of the globe, has no parallel in history. It has turned traditionally listless areas of the world into seething cauldrons of change.

On the whole, it has not been a very peaceful process.

In the last 8 years alone there have been no less than 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence, each of them specifically designed as a serious challenge to the authority, or the very existence, of the government in question. Eighty two different governments have been directly involved.

What is striking is that only 15 of these 164 significant resorts to violence have been military conflicts between two states. And not a single one of the 164 conflicts has been a formally declared war. Indeed, there has not been a formal declaration of war anywhere in the world since World War II.

The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on, not merely because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large number of de facto conflicts and because the trend of such conflicts is growing rather than diminishing. At the beginning of 1958, there were 23 prolonged insurgencies going on about the world. As of February 1, 1966, there were 40. Further, the total number of outbreaks of violence has increased each year: In 1958, there were 34; in 1965, there were 58.

The Relationship of Violence and Economic Status

But what is most significant of all is that there is a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted. The World Bank divides nations on the basis of per capita income into four categories: rich, middle income, poor, and very poor.

The rich nations are those with a per capita income of $750 per year or more.

The current U.S. level is more than $2,700. There are 27 of these rich nations. They possess 75 percent of the world's wealth, though roughly only 25 percent of the world's population.

Since 1958, only one of these 27 nations has suffered a major internal upheaval on its own territory. But observe what happens at the other end of the economic scale.

Among the 38 very poor nations those with a per capita income of under $100 a year not less than 32 have suffered significant conflicts. Indeed, they have suffered an average of two major outbreaks of violence per country in the 8 year period. That is a great deal of conflict.

What is worse, it has been predominantly conflict of a prolonged nature. The trend holds predictably constant in the case of the two other categories: the poor and the middle income nations. Since 1958, 87 percent of the very poor nations, 69 percent of the poor nations, and 48 percent of the middle income nations have suffered serious violence.

There can, then, be no question but that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness. And the trend of such violence is up, not down.

Now, it would perhaps be somewhat reassuring if the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations were closing and economic backwardness were significantly receding. But it is not. The economic gap is widening.

By the year 1970 over one half of the world's total population will live in the independent nations sweeping across the southern half of the planet. But this hungering half of the human race will by then command only one sixth of the world's total of goods and services. By the year 1975 the dependent children of these nations alone children under 15 years of age will equal the total population of the developed nations to the north.

Even in our own abundant societies, we have reason enough to worry over the tensions that coil and tighten among underprivileged young people and finally flail out in delinquency and crime. What are we to expect from a whole hemisphere of youth where mounting frustrations are likely to fester into eruptions of violence and extremism?

Annual per capita income in roughly half of the 80 underdeveloped nations that are members of the World Bank is rising by a paltry 1 percent a year or less. By the end of the century these nations, at their present rates of growth, will reach a per capita income of barely $170 a year. The United States, by the same criterion, will attain a per capita income of $4,500.

The conclusion to all of this is blunt and inescapable: Given the certain connection between economic stagnation and the incidence of violence, the years that lie ahead for the nations in the southern half of the globe are pregnant with violence.

U.S. Security and the Newly Developing World

This would be true even if no threat of Communist subversion existed is it clearly does. Both Moscow and Peking, however harsh their internal differences, regard the whole modernization process as an ideal environment for the growth of communism. Their experience with subversive internal war is extensive, and they have developed a considerable array of both doctrine and practical measures in the art of political violence.

What is often misunderstood is that Communists are capable of subverting, manipulating, and finally directing for their own ends the wholly legitimate grievances of a developing society.

But it would be a gross oversimplification to regard communism as the central factor in every conflict throughout the underdeveloped world. Of the 149 serious internal insurgencies in the past 8 years, Communists have been involved in only 58 of them—8 percent of the total—and this includes seven instances in which a Communist regime itself was the target of the uprising.

Whether Communists are involved or not, violence anywhere in a taut world transmits sharp signals through the complex gangli of international relations; and the security of the United States is related to the security and stability of nations half a glob away.

But neither conscience nor sanity itself suggests that the United States is, should or could be the global gendarme. Quite the contrary. Experience confirms what human nature suggests: that in most instances of internal violence the local people themselves are best able to deal directly with the situation within the framework of their own traditions.

The United States has no mandate from on high to police the world and no inclination to do so. There have been classic case in which our deliberate non-action was the wisest action of all. Where our help is not sought, it is seldom prudent to volunteer. Certainly we have no charter to rescue floundering regimes who have brought violence on themselves by deliberately refusing to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizenry.

Further, throughout the next decade advancing technology will reduce the requirements for bases and staging rights at particular locations abroad, and the whole pattern of forward deployment will gradually change.
But, though all these caveats are clear enough, the irreducible fact remains that our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world. And our role must be precisely this: to help provide security to those developing nations which genuinely need and request our help and which demonstrably are willing and able to help themselves.

Security and Development

The rub comes in this: We do not always grasp the meaning of the word "security" in this context. In a modernizing society, security means development.

Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development. Without development, there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop simply cannot remain "secure." It cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its own citizenry cannot shed its human nature.

If security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. Without internal development of at least a minimal degree, order and stability are simply not possible. They are not possible because human nature cannot be frustrated beyond intrinsic limits. It reacts because it must.

Now, that is what we do not always understand, and that is also what governments of modernizing nations do not always understand. But by emphasizing that security arises from development, I do not say that an underdeveloped nation cannot be subverted from within, or be aggressed upon from without, or be the victim of a combination of the two. It can. And to prevent any or all of these conditions, a nation does require appropriate military capabilities to deal with the specific problem. But the specific military problem is only a narrow facet of the broader security problem.

Military force can help provide law and order but only to the degree that a basis for law and order already exists in the developing society: a basic willingness on the part of the people to cooperate. The law and order is a shield, behind which the central fact of security—development—can be achieved.

Now we are not playing a semantic game with these words. The trouble is that we have been lost in a semantic jungle for too long. We have come to identify "security" with exclusively military phenomena, and most particularly with military hardware. But it just isn't so. And we need to accommodate to the facts of the matter if we want to see security survive and grow in the southern half of the globe.

Development means economic, social, and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, and the word "reasonable" in this context requires continual redefinition. What is "reasonable" in an earlier stage of development will become "unreasonable" in a later stage.

As development progresses, security progresses. And when the people of a nation have organized their own human and natural resources to provide themselves with what they need and expect out of life and have learned to compromise peacefully among competing demands in the larger national interest then their resistance to disorder and violence will be enormously increased.

Conversely, the tragic need of desperate men to resort to force to achieve the inner imperatives of human decency will diminish.

Military and Economic Spheres of U.S. Aid

Now, I have said that the role of the United States is to help provide security to these modernizing nations, providing they need and request our help and are clearly willing and able to help themselves. But what should our help be? Clearly, it should be help toward development. In the military sphere, that involves two broad categories of assistance.

We should help the developing nation with such training and equipment as is necessary to maintain the protective shield behind which development can go forward.

The dimensions of that shield vary from country to country, but what is essential is that it should be a shield and not a capacity for external aggression.

The second, and perhaps less understood category of military assistance in a modernizing nation, is training in civic action. Civic action is another one of those semantic puzzles. Too few Americans and too few officials in developing nations really comprehend what military civic action means. Essentially, it means using indigenous military forces for nontraditional military projects, projects that are useful to the local population in fields such as education, public works, health, sanitation, agriculture—indeed, anything connected with economic or social progress.

It has had some impressive results. In the past 4 years the U.S. assisted civic action program, worldwide, has constructed or repaired more than 10,000 miles of roads, built over 1,000 schools, hundreds of hospitals and clinics, and has provided medical and dental care to approximately 4 million people.

What is important is that all this was done by indigenous men in uniform. Quite apart from the developmental projects themselves, the program powerfully alters the negative image of the military man as the oppressive preserver of the stagnant status quo.

But assistance in the purely military sphere is not enough. Economic assistance is also essential. The President is determined that our aid should be hardheaded and rigorously realistic, that it should deal directly with the roots of underdevelopment and not merely attempt to alleviate the symptoms. His bedrock principle is that U.S. economic aid—no matter what its magnitude—is futile unless the country in question is resolute in making the primary effort itself. That will be the criterion, and that will be the crucial condition for all our future assistance.

Only the developing nations themselves can take the fundamental measures that make outside assistance meaningful. These measures are often unpalatable and frequently call for political courage and decisiveness. But to fail to undertake painful, but essential, reform inevitably leads to far more painful revolutionary violence. Our economic assistance is designed to offer a reasonable alternative to that violence. It is designed to help substitute peaceful progress for tragic internal conflict.

The United States intends to be compassionate and generous in this effort, but it is not an effort it can carry exclusively by itself. And thus it looks to those nations who have reached the point of self-sustaining prosperity to increase their contribution to the development and, thus, to the security of the modernizing world.

Sharing Peacekeeping Responsibilities

And that brings me to the second set of relationships that I underscored at the outset; it is the policy of the United States to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with those nations who can, and should, share international peacekeeping responsibilities.

America has devoted a higher proportion of its gross national product to its military establishment than any other major free-world nation. This was true even before our increased expenditures in Southeast Asia. We have had, over the last few years, as many men in uniform as all the nations of Western Europe combined, even though they have a population half again greater than our own.

Now, the American people are not going to shirk their obligations in any part of the world, but they clearly cannot be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the common burden indefinitely. If, for example, other nations genuinely believe—as they say they do—that it is in the common interest to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and political control beyond its national boundaries, then they must take a more active role in guarding the defense perimeter. Let me be perfectly clear. This is not to question the policy of neutralism or nonalignment of any particular nation. But it is to emphasize that the independence of such nations can, in the end, be fully safeguarded only by collective agreements among themselves and their neighbors.

The plain truth is the day is coming when no single nation, however powerful, can undertake by itself to keep the peace outside its own borders. Regional and international organizations for peacekeeping purposes are as yet rudimentary, but they must grow in experience and be strengthened by deliberate and practical cooperative action.

In this matter, the example of Canada is a model for nations everywhere. As Prime Minister Pearson pointed out eloquently in New York just last week: Canada "is as deeply involved in the world's affairs as any country of its size. We accept this because we have learned over 50 years that isolation from the policies that determine war does not give us immunity from the bloody, sacrificial consequences of their failure. We learned that in 1914 and again in 1939. . . . That is why we have been proud to send our men to take part in every peacekeeping operation of the United Nations in Korea, and Kashmir, and the Suez, and the Congo, and Cyprus."

The Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic, the more than 30 nations contributing troops or supplies to assist the Government of South Vietnam, indeed even the parallel efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pakistan-India conflict these efforts, together with those of the U.N., are the first attempts to substitute multinational for unilateral policing of violence. They point to the peacekeeping patterns of the future.

We must not merely applaud the idea. We must dedicate talent, resources, and hard practical thinking to its implementation. In Western Europe, an area whose burgeoning economic vitality stands as a monument to the wisdom of the Marshall Plan, the problems of security are neither static nor wholly new. Fundamental changes are under way, though certain inescapable realities remain. The conventional forces of NATO, for example, still require a nuclear backdrop far beyond the capability of any Western European nation to supply, and the United States is fully committed to provide that major nuclear deterrent.

However, the European members of the alliance have a natural desire to participate more actively in nuclear planning. A central task of the alliance today is, therefore, to work out the relationships and institutions through which shared nuclear planning can be effective. We have made a practical and promising start in the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers.

Common planning and consultation are essential aspects of any sensible substitute to the unworkable and dangerous alternative of independent national nuclear forces within the alliance. And even beyond the alliance we must find the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is a clear imperative.

There are, of course, risks in nonproliferation arrangements, but they cannot be compared with the infinitely greater risks that would arise out of the increase in national nuclear stockpiles. In the calculus of risk, to proliferate independent national nuclear forces is not a mere arithmetical addition of danger. We would not be merely adding up risks. We would be insanely multiplying them.

If we seriously intend to pass on a world to our children that is not threatened by nuclear holocaust, we must come to grips with the problem of proliferation. A reasonable nonproliferation agreement is feasible. For there is no adversary with whom we do not share a common interest in avoiding mutual destruction triggered by an irresponsible nth power. Dealing With Potential Adversaries

That brings me to the third and last set of relationships the United States must deal with: those with nations who might be tempted to take up arms against us.

These relationships call for realism. But realism is not a hardened, inflexible, unimaginative attitude. The realistic mind is a restlessly creative mind, free of naive delusions but full of practical alternatives. There are practical alternatives to our current relationships with both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

A vast ideological chasm separates us from them and to a degree separates them from one another. There is nothing to be gained from our seeking an ideological rapproachment; but breaching the isolation of great nations like Red China, even when that isolation is largely of its own making reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings and increase the incentive on both sides to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force.

There are many ways in which we can build bridges toward nations who would cut themselves off from meaningful contact with us. We can do so with properly balanced trade relations, diplomatic contacts and in some cases even by exchanges of military observers. We have to know when it is we want to place this bridge, what sort of traffic we want to travel over it, an on what mutual foundations the whole structure can be designed.

There are no one cliff bridges. If you are going to span a chasm, you have to rest the structure on both cliffs. Now cliffs, generally speaking, are rather hazardous places. Some people are afraid even to look over the edge. But in a thermonuclear world, we cannot afford any political acrophobia.

President Johnson has put the matter squarely: By building bridges to those who make themselves our adversaries, "we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort."

With respect to a "community of effort" let me suggest a concrete proposal for our own present young generation in the United States. It is a committed and dedicated generation. It has proven that in its enormously impressive performance in the Peace Corps overseas and in its willingness to volunteer for a final assault on such poverty and lack of opportunity that still remain in our own country.

As matters stand, our present Selective Service System draws on only a minority of eligible young men. That is an inequity. It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity by asking every young person in the United States to give 2 years of service to his country whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps, or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad.

We could encourage other countries to do the same, and we could work out exchange programs much as the Peace Corps is already planning to do.

While this is not an altogether new suggestion, it has been criticized as inappropriate while we are engaged in a shooting war. But I believe precisely the opposite is the case. It is more appropriate now than ever. For it would underscore what our whole purpose is in Vietnam and indeed anywhere in the world where coercion, or injustice, or lack of decent opportunity still holds sway. It would make meaningful the central concept of security a world of decency and development where every man can feel that his personal horizon is rimmed with hope. Mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual effort those are the goals. Can we achieve those goals with the Soviet Union, and with Communist China? Can they achieve them with one another?

The answer to these questions lies in the answer to an even more fundamental question. Who is man? Is he a rational animal? If he is, then the goals can ultimately be achieved. If he is not, then there is little point in making the effort.

All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a rational animal but with a near infinite capacity for folly. His history seems largely a halting, but persistent, effort to raise his reason above his animality. He draws blueprints for utopia. But never quite gets it built. In the end he plugs away obstinately with the only building material really ever at hand his own part-comic, part-tragic, part-cussed, but part-glorious nature.

I, for one, would not count a global free society out. Coercion, after all, merely captures man. Freedom captivates him.